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CORPORATIONS TRANSFER OF STOCK LIABILITY TO REMAINDERMAN FOR ABSOLUTE TRANSFER AT INSTANCE OF LIFE TENANT X, life

tenant of certain stock of defendant company under a will, endorsed the certificates as life tenant; Y Company guaranteed his signature and itself endorsed
in blank. Defendant, with knowledge of X's limited interest, transferred the
stock on the books and issued new certificates to Y Company absolutely. Learning of their interests after X's death, plainti:ff-remaindermen demanded certificates for the stock from defendant, which refused. In their action for conversion,
held:, that defendant breached its fiduciary duty to plaintiffs in making an absolute transfer with knowledge that the transferee had only a life interest and
no power to sell or consume.1 Biddle, J., dissenting, interpreted the will as

1 Section I {a) of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act was held to be inapplicable
because X "did not appear 'by the certificate to be the owner of the shares represented
thereby.'" And section 3 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act did not protect defendant
because "the statute does n9t authorize the transfer of the whole title • , • [by] one
who possesses nothing more than a life interest therein." Principal case, 107 F. (2d) at
62, 63.

1940]

RECENT DECISIONS

making the life tenant a quasi-trustee with power to sell and buy securities, so
that defendant could properly transfer the stock at his direction. Seymour v.
National Biscuit Company, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 58.
This case, an exemplification of one aspect of the liability of a corporation
to the true owner for an unauthorized transfer of stock on its books,2 is perhaps more interesting because of the disagreement among the judges than for
the actual decision. The rationale 8 of the rule involved seems to be universally
accepted, but its relation to a given set of facts_ is, of course, open to diverse
opinion. Obviously the difficulty lies in determining which transfers are "unauthorized" from the corporation's standpoint. Transfer by an executor charges
a corporation with notice of the will/ and any transfer inconsistent therewith
induces liability. 5 Hence, if the stock passes to one with only a life interest, the
corporation must beware lest an attempt be made to transfer beyond the life
tenant's authority.6 A correlative to liability for aiding such a transfer is the
right to refuse to issue certificates without showing thereon that the interest is
limited.7 Since a corporation can be held liable to a transferee for refusal to
make a legitimate transfer,8 the authority in a life tenant to transfer absolutely
should be clearly stated in order to impose a duty on the corporation to record
the transfer. Otherwise, the corporation must determine the question of scope
of authority by mere conjecture and this could put it in a serious dilemma. But,
2 For other situations involving this liability, see the discussion in 45 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1076 (1913). On the general problem, see 6 THOMPSON, CoRPORATIONs,
3d ed., § 4435 (1927); 12 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., §
5549 (193 2).
8
A common explanation is that the corporation "is made the custodian of the
shares ••• and is clothed with power to protect the rights of everyone from unauthorized transfer. It is a trust .•. for the protection of individual interests, as well as its
own, and like every other trustee, it is bound to execute the trust with proper diligence
and care, and is responsible for any loss sustained by its negligence or misconduct."
Cox v. First Nat. Bank of Wilson, 119 N. C. 302 at 304, 26 S. E. 22 (1896).
'Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 F. Cas. 1040, No. 8581 (1848);
Wooten v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 128 N. C. 119, 38 S. E. 298 (1901); 12
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., 481, 493 (1932).
8
Usually the executor has power to sell. If so, the corporation is liable when he
transfers in abuse of the power only when it knows of or has reasonable ground to suspect
misconduct. Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 F. Cas. 1040, No. 8,581
{1848). When the transfer is to a legatee, the corporation has been said to be acting
at its peril. Wooten v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 128 N. C. 119, 32 S. E. 298
(1901).
8
"If it be conceded that the executor had the right .•• to have the stock transferred to the owners of the defeasible estate, this does not affect the question of [ the
corporation's] liability, as the wrong done to the plaintiffs, which caused the loss of their
stock, was in permitting and aiding in the sale to Proctor, when the defendant knew, in
law, that the seller did not have an absolute estate, and that if he died without issue
the stock would belong to plaintiffs." Baker v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 173 N. C.
365 at 371, 92 S. E. 170 (1916).
1
Lynn v. General Motors, (App. Div. 1937) 298 N. Y. S. 976. See CHRISTY,
THE TRANSFER OF STOCK, § 76 (1929).
8
18 C. J. S. 1055 (1939).
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in the one case which the writer found denying recovery to the remainderman, it
did quite clearly appear from the will that the life tenant had "plenary powers
to sell ••• whenever in the exercise of her judgment a change in the investment
became necessary." 9 The _principal case is apparently in accord w:ith those involving similar testamentary provisions as to the life tenant's powers.10 The
dissentient's view that an absolute transfer would not have been a wrong to the
remaindermen is somewhat difficult to sustain on the facts appearing in the report
of the case.
James D. Ritchie

9 Hughes v. Drovers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 86 Md. 418 at
423, 38 A. 936 (1897). There the will read: "all of which [stock] is to be transferred
to her in her own name, to use the interest thereof as long as she may live, and at her
death to be equally divided among her children, unless she becomes a widow, then
she is to have full control of this bequest, to do with it as she pleases."
1 ° Caulkins v. Memphis Gas-Light Co., I Pickle (85 Tenn.) 683, 4 S. W.
287 (1887); West v. 'American Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 Ohio App. 369, 7 N. E. (2d)
805 (1936). In the latter case the life tenant was still alive, and it was held that
remainderman's right to the stock was not accelerated but that he could demand certificates so issued as to protect the interests of all concerned or, upon refusal, he could
bring a damage action. In West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 108
F. (2d} 347, the same facts were involved, but the circuit court of appeals held that
no demand was necessary and hence the cause of action, arising in 1927 and not in
1934 (when demand was first made)', was barred by the 4-year limitations statute;
that even if demand were necessary, the remaindermen would be barred by laches.
The refusal of the -Ohio Supreme Court to certify the record in the first case was
regarded as making no law and the federal court was held not bound by the judgment
of the inferior state court.

